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If It Only Had a Heart: Supreme 
Court Eschews Compassion for Cash-
Strapped Consumers in Upholding the 
Validity of Arbitration Clauses in 
Credit Repair Contracts 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a time of job insecurity, fluctuating household incomes, and mixed signals 
of economic recovery, Americans have turned to credit as a significant means of 
payment.2 The amount of credit available to a consumer is affected by his credit 
score.3 A “good” credit score can get a consumer approved for credit and a better 
score generally correlates with a smaller interest rate, limiting the consumer’s cost 
of borrowing.4 If a consumer’s credit score is too low, a bank may not extend 
credit at all.5 For years, credit repair organizations have promised consumers that 
they can positively affect these scores, in exchange for payment.6 However, due to 
widespread scamming by deceptive credit repair organizations, Congress heavily 
regulated the credit repair service industry by enacting the Credit Repair Organi-
zations Act (CROA).7 
In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court was faced with the 
issue of whether consumers’ claims under the CROA can be resolved through 
contractually required arbitration, or whether the language of the statute requires 
 ___________________________  
 1. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012), rev’g 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 2. Consumer Credit Rises More Than Expected in January, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2012, 4:29 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/07/us-consumer-credit-idUSTRE8261TQ20120307 (reporting 
that the U.S. unemployment rate, though falling “sharply” recently, is still “well above pre-recession 
levels”; reporting that U.S. household incomes have, in the aggregate, posted both gains and losses in 
the past few months; and reporting that U.S. consumer credit has increased for the past five months); 
Jonathan Cable & Kevin Yao, Global Economy-Europe Drags on World Economy, US Fares Better, 
REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/global-economy-
wrapup-idUSL4E8E13IO20120301 (reporting that while Europe’s economy is down, Asia’s is show-
ing signs of growth and the U.S. is displaying potential for a “self-sustaining recovery path” from the 
global recession). 
 3. Leslie McFadden, What is a Credit Score?, BANKRATE.COM (Apr. 22, 2010), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/credit-cards/what-is-a-credit-score.aspx. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. James P. Nehf, A Legislative Framework for Reducing Fraud in the Credit Repair Industry, 70 
N.C. L. REV. 781, 798-99 (1992). 
 7. Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006); see also Genevieve Hanft, Giving 
Arbitration Some Credit: The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Under the Credit Repair Organiza-
tions Act, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2769-70 (2011). 
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resolution of these claims to occur in federal court.8 The Court held that agree-
ments between credit repair organizations (CROs) and consumers may include 
enforceable arbitration agreements.9 This note criticizes the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning, partly inspired by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. In enforcing arbitrability of 
CROA disputes, the Court has acted contrary to Congress’ purposes of the Act: to 
ensure that consumers are making an “informed decision” when dealing with 
CROs and to protect consumers from deceptive credit repair services.10 In light of 
this decisive interpretation of the CROA, more protection of consumers is re-
quired if they are to understand that entering into a credit repair contract will limit 
the forums in which they can enforce civil liability against CROs who violate the 
Act. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Plaintiffs Wanda Greenwood, Ladelle Hatfield, and Deborah McCleese en-
tered into individual credit card agreements with co-defendant Columbus Bank 
and Trust (Columbus).11 Co-defendant CompuCredit Corporation (CompuCredit) 
exclusively marketed and advertised the credit cards for Columbus.12 Plaintiffs 
signed up for a credit card offer via a “Pre-Approved Acceptance Certificate” sent 
in the mail by CompuCredit.13 CompuCredit sent plaintiffs various promotional 
materials in addition to the Acceptance Certificate, which included several repre-
sentations about the benefits of the card.14 Despite claiming that “no deposit [was] 
required” in setting up the account, Columbus charged several fees to the newly 
opened credit account, effectively reducing the initial $300 credit limit.15 Plaintiffs 
filed a complaint in the United States District Court, Northern California, alleging 
misrepresentations by defendants and violations of the Credit Repair Organiza-
tions Act (CROA)16 and California state law.17 
 ___________________________  
 8. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012), rev’g 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 9. Id. at 673. 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 1679(b). 
 11. Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 980, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 615 F.3d 
1204 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. The terms of the agreement between the parties were contained on the “Acceptance Certifi-
cate.” Id. 
 14. Id. The promotional materials made representations that defendant’s services could help the 
consumer “rebuild your credit,” “rebuild poor credit,” and “improve your credit rating.” Id. 
 15. Id. These fees included “a $29 finance charge, a monthly $6.50 account maintenance fee and a 
$150 annual fee.”  Id. 
 16. Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006). 
 17. Greenwood, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 982.  Defendants did not dispute that they were a “credit repair 
organization” under the CROA and thus subject to the provisions of CROA. Id. at n.2. The CROA is 
an act that provides consumers certain protection in their dealings with credit repair organizations. 
Hanft, supra note 7, at 2770. The plaintiffs complained that defendants misled them about several fees 
associated with opening their accounts, and the detrimental effect that those fees had on the plaintiffs’ 
credit limit. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668. 
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The defendants responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration on plain-
tiffs’ CROA claims, pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties’ contract.18 
Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement was void under the CROA because 
the CROA granted credit consumers a non-waivable “right to sue.”19 The district 
court denied the motion to compel arbitration, holding that a requirement of arbi-
tration of a dispute under the CROA was “incompatible with [the] CROA’s non-
waivable right to sue.”20 Defendants appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Ninth Circuit.21 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
motion to compel arbitration, holding that the CROA language “right to sue” 
should receive its “plain and ordinary meaning.”22 The court rejected defendants’ 
argument that Congress used the words “right to sue” as a form of uncomplicated 
shorthand which would be easier for consumers to understand.23 Additionally, the 
Ninth Circuit adopted plaintiffs’ argument that Congress intended to provide con-
sumers with a non-waivable right to bring an action in a court of law.24 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision.25 The Court found that the CROA language informing consum-
ers of their “right to sue” did not create a non-waivable right to bring an action in 
a court of law.26 It rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the CROA “right to sue” lan-
guage created “a ‘right’ to bring an action in court” solely on the ground that the 
provision repeatedly used terms such as “action,” “class action,” and “court.”27 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that in enacting the CROA, 
Congress did not “overrid[e]” the federal law of enforceability of arbitration 
clauses.28 
The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the CROA’s disclosure pro-
vision improperly required credit organizations to mislead customers by promis-
 ___________________________  
 18. Greenwood, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 982, 984. The arbitration clause stated, in relevant part: “Any 
claim, dispute or controversy . . . at any time arising from or relating to your Account . . . or this 
Agreement . . . upon election of you or us, will be resolved by binding arbitration . . . .” Id. at 983. 
 19. Id. at 984-85. The “right to sue” language originated in the text of a CROA-mandated disclosure 
statement that must be provided to consumers prior to execution of the contract. CompuCredit, 132 S. 
Ct. at 669. The required disclosure language states, in relevant part: “You have a right to sue a credit 
repair organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization Act.” Credit Repair Organizations Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a). The non-waiver provision states, in relevant part: “Any waiver by any consumer 
of any protection by or any right of the consumer under this subchapter—(1) shall be treated as void; 
and (2) may not be enforced by a Federal or State court or any other person.” Credit Repair Organiza-
tions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a)(1), (2). 
 20. Greenwood, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
 21. Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’g 617 F. Supp. 2d 980 
(N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 22. Id. at 1208, 1214. The Ninth Circuit essentially adopted plaintiffs’ argument from the district 
court: the language of the CROA included a “right” to sue in court which, pursuant to language in 
another subsection of the CROA, was not waivable by the consumer. Id. at 1207-08. 
 23. Id. at 1209-11. The court also rejected defendants’ argument that Congress intended for the word 
“sue” to be interpreted broadly enough to mean “arbitrate.” Id. at 1208-09. 
 24. Id. at 1214. 
 25. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012), rev’g 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 26. Id. at 669-70. 
 27. Id. at 670. 
 28. Id. at 668-69 (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
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ing a “right” that was not actually being provided.29 In addition, the Supreme 
Court opined that Congress, had it intended to prohibit arbitration in the type of 
credit agreements at issue, would have done so more expressly in the Act.30 In 
reversing and remanding the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
held that because the CROA was silent on the question of arbitrability, the FAA 
requires enforcement of an arbitration agreement according to its terms.31 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Federal courts have a well-established history of enforcing arbitration agree-
ments out of respect for the parties’ intent and the effectiveness of the arbitral 
forum. This enforceability applies even when a claim is brought under a federal 
statute.32 An exception to enforceability exists when Congress “evinces an intent” 
to prevent a party from waiving their judicial remedies under a Federal Act.33 
Since the enactment of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) in 1996, 
federal courts have struggled over the issue of enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments in contracts between consumers and credit providers that fall under the 
Act’s reach.34 
A. Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Claims                     
Brought under Federal Statutes 
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to combat “ju-
dicial resistance to arbitration.”35 Section 2 of the FAA renders agreements to 
settle disputes by arbitration “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” in commercial 
transactions.36 However, the validity of an arbitration agreement is subject to 
“such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.”37 The 
Supreme Court has called this section of the FAA “a congressional declaration of 
a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”38  
The FAA includes a process by which parties may compel arbitration.39 When 
one party refuses to arbitrate a dispute, the party wishing to enforce arbitration 
may seek a federal district court order to arbitrate according to the terms of the 
parties’ contract.40 The Supreme Court has emphasized that a district court is re-
quired to compel arbitration once it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the 
 ___________________________  
 29. Id. at 671. The Court ruled that the language “right to sue” was “a colloquial method of com-
municating to consumers that they have the legal right, enforceable in court, to recover damages from 
credit repair organizations that violate the CROA.” Id. at 672. 
 30. Id. at 672-73. 
 31. Id. at 673. 
 32. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). 
 33. Id. at 628. 
 34. See Hanft, supra note 7, at  2791-2803 (examining “the circuit split over the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements under the CROA”). 
 35. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
 36. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 39. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.  
 40. Id. § 4. 
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disputed issue exists, and at least one party has failed to comply with such agree-
ment.41 If a court compels arbitration, then it must stay any related federal court 
proceedings until the arbitration can occur within the terms of the agreement.42 
Federal courts have upheld arbitration agreements even when a party makes a 
claim under a federal statute.43 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld an agreement to arbitrate a dispute 
under the Sherman Act.44 With a focus on honoring the intent of the parties, the 
Court extended the pro-arbitration policy of federal courts to claims based on 
federal statutory rights.45 The Court supported this extension of the federal policy 
by reasoning that the FAA “provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims.”46 The Court described an agreement to arbitrate as a con-
tractual choice by parties to obtain the arbitral benefits of “simplicity, informality, 
and expedition,” and not as a forfeiture of their “substantive rights afforded by 
statute.”47 By agreeing to arbitrate, a consumer simply selects an alternate forum 
in which they may vindicate their rights.48 
While the Supreme Court invoked the pro-arbitration policy of Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hosp. to enforce an arbitration agreement in Mitsubishi Motors, it 
also identified a “category of claims” that fall into a narrow exception to the rule 
of liberal enforcement.49 According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi 
Motors, agreements to arbitrate should be enforced unless Congress has expressed 
an intent to “preclude a waiver of judicial remedies” from certain statutory 
rights.50 Courts may look to the text and legislative history of statutes in assessing 
the presence or absence of such intent.51 The Mitsubishi Motors Court did not 
 ___________________________  
 41. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 4 (2006) (“The court . . . upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the 
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, . . . shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration . . . .”). The Ninth Circuit has described the district court’s analysis in a simple, two-part 
test: “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement en-
compasses the dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th 
Cir. 2000). If these elements are met, the district court by law has no choice but to compel the arbitra-
tion.  
 42. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
 43. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (en-
forcing an agreement to arbitrate a claim made under the Sherman Act); Shearson/American Express v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate a claim made under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 
(1991) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate a claim made under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act). These three cases are especially relevant because the Supreme Court used them to support 
its decision to uphold the arbitration agreement in CompuCredit. Each will be dealt with in detail. See 
also Hanft, supra note 7, at 2782-85.  
 44. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 640. 
 45. Id. at 626-27. 
 46. Id. at 627. 
 47. Id. at 628. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 627-28.  
 50. Id. at 628 (“Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress 
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at 
issue.”). 
 51. Id. 
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disturb the other longstanding bars to enforcement of arbitration agreements such 
as fraud or “overwhelming economic power.”52  
Relying heavily on the rule announced in Mitsubishi Motors, the Supreme 
Court once again upheld a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in the face of a claim 
made under a federal statute in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.53 
The Court determined the issue of whether Congress had intended to except the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Exchange 
Act from the rule of enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA.54 As 
to RICO, the Court found congressional “silence” in the statutory text and legisla-
tive history of the Act, and deemed this silence a lack of intent to prohibit the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.55  
As to the Exchange Act, the McMahon Court also declined to find the requi-
site congressional intent to overcome the presumption about enforceable arbitra-
tion agreements.56 The text of the Act contained a “non-waiver” provision prohib-
iting contract terms which required “any person to waive compliance with any 
provision of [the Act].”57 In another section of the Act, a jurisdictional provision 
purported to give exclusive jurisdiction of violations of the Act to federal courts.58 
Plaintiffs argued that Congress, by including these separate but related provisions, 
intended for the non-waiver provision to prevent a consumer from waiving exclu-
sive jurisdiction by agreeing to resolve disputes through private arbitration.59 The 
Court reasoned that the non-waiver provision only prohibited the enforcement of 
agreements to waive compliance with the Act.60 The jurisdictional provision, the 
Court determined, did contain any duty with which a party must “comply.”61 
Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the arbitrability of disputes under the Ex-
change Act.62 
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court again found 
no reason to stray from its pro-arbitration stance.63 Applying the Mitsubishi Mo-
tors test of congressional intent, the Court found no support for plaintiff’s argu-
ment that enforcing a pre-dispute arbitration agreement would be inconsistent with 
 ___________________________  
 52. Id. These and other grounds for precluding the enforcement of an arbitration agreement fall 
under section 2 of the FAA as “grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.” 
See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 53. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). 
 54. Id. at 227; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 55. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238-42. 
 56. Id. at 238. 
 57. Id. at 227 (quoting Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2006)). 
 58. Id. at 227-28 (quoting Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2006)). The Act states in pertinent 
part:  
 
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this 
title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought 
to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder. 
 
Id. 
 59. Id. at 228. 
 60. Id.  
 61. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228. 
 62. Id. at 238. 
 63. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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the underlying purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).64 
Justice White, writing for the majority, even revealed a consistency between the 
arbitration and the ADEA: the Act’s “flexible approach” of pursuing “informal 
methods of . . . conference . . . and persuasion.”65 Pointing to its decisions in 
Mitsubishi Motors and McMahon, the Court reasoned that arbitrating claims under 
the ADEA, as with RICO and the Sherman Act, could occur without disturbing 
the Act’s advancement of “important public policies.”66 The Court also reiterated 
its position that “generalized attacks on arbitration” are insufficient to overcome 
the presumption of validity of arbitration agreements.67 
B. Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements under the                         
Credit Repair Organizations Act 
In 1996, Congress passed the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA)68 to 
help remedy a situation where credit repair organizations were collecting fees 
from consumers already in poor financial condition.69 The legislative history of 
the Act reveals Congress’ belief that credit repair organizations “pose a greater 
threat than they are worth.”70 Congress also drafted the Act in light of society’s 
emphasis on consumer credit history.71 Congress aimed to combat the consumers’ 
lack of knowledge of the activities of some credit repair organizations.72  The 
solution, Congress decided, was to require these organizations to disclose certain 
information to consumers and to hold the organizations accountable through the 
threat of civil liability.73 
The CROA regulates the activities of “credit repair organizations”74 (CROs) 
by imposing civil liability on CROs that violate any of four substantive actions.75 
 ___________________________  
 64. Id. at 27-35. 
 65. Id. at 29 (former quotation from the opinion and latter quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006)). 
 66. Id. at 27-28. 
 67. Id. at 30. Among these attacks, plaintiff complained of arbitration’s limited discovery, bias 
amongst arbitral panels, and a lack of public knowledge of arbitral awards. Id. at 30-32. The Court 
staunchly rejected all of them. Id.  
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006). 
 69. Hanft, supra note 7, at 2769. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.; see H.R. Rep. No. 103-486, at *64 (1994) (“This title seeks to . . . ensure that consumers are 
provided with necessary information about credit repair organizations so that they can make informed 
decisions regarding the purchase of their services and to protect the public from unfair and deceptive 
advertising and business practices by the industry.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1679(b)(1), (2) (“The purposes of 
this subchapter are . . . to ensure that prospective buyers of the services of credit repair organizations 
are provided with the information necessary to make an informed decision . . . and to protect the public 
from unfair or deceptive advertising and business practices by credit repair organizations.”). 
 73. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679c, 1679g.  
 74. Roughly, a credit repair organization is business that provides services such as improving con-
sumers’ credit ratings and advising or assisting consumers “with regard to any activity or service 
described [in the Act].” Id. § 1679a(3)(A). 
 75. See id. § 1679b(a)(1)-(4). CROs can incur liability under the CROA by making false or mislead-
ing statements about consumers’ credit scores to certain interested parties. Id. § 1679b(a)(1). Such 
interested parties include any “consumer reporting agency” or creditors or potential creditors of the 
consumer. Id. CROs violate the CROA by advising consumers to alter his or her identity “to prevent 
display of the consumer’s credit record, history, or rating for the purpose of concealing adverse infor-
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Among these actions, CROs may violate the act by misrepresenting the services 
they provide, or defrauding or deceiving “any person in connection with . . . the 
sale of the[ir] services.”76 CROs are required to disclose certain information to a 
prospective consumer prior to executing a contract.77 Several provisions under this 
section begin with the language, “You have a right to . . . ,” and proceed to pro-
vide the reader with a description of his rights with respect to his contract with the 
CRO.78 One of these rights is the “right to sue” a violator CRO.79 This provision 
of the CROA has endured much scrutiny in federal litigation.80 The Act also con-
tains a broadly-worded non-waiver provision which voids “any waiver by any 
consumer of any protection provided by or any right of the consumer under this 
subchapter . . . .”81 
A credit repair organization is liable in actual and punitive damages when it 
engages in one or more “prohibited practices” of § 1679b of the CROA.82 An 
aggrieved consumer may recover actual damages sustained as a result of the viola-
tion or the amount he paid to the organization, whichever is greater.83 The civil 
liability provision also provides for punitive damages in individual or class “ac-
tions.”84 In both types of actions, the amount of punitive damages is at the discre-
tion of the court.85 A party who brings a successful action for actual or punitive 
damages may also be awarded attorneys’ fees.86 
Unlike claims under the Sherman Act, RICO, and the ADEA, the Supreme 
Court had not, until 2012, determined the enforceability of arbitration provisions 
for claims made under the CROA.87 The issue had been considered only three 
times at the federal circuit court level and three additional times in federal district 
courts.88 The majority of these decisions had been in favor of defendant CROs, 
enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements in CROA-regulated contracts.89 The 
hallmark holding of these decisions has been that the CROA’s language does not 
 ___________________________  
mation” from the same interested parties named in section (a)(1). Id. § 1679b(a)(2). See also id. § 
1679g (CROA provision establishing civil liability for violations of the Act). 
 76. Id. § 1679b(a)(3), (4). 
 77. Id. § 1679c. 
 78. Id. § 1679c(a). 
 79. The provision states, in pertinent part: “You have a right to sue a credit repair organization that 
violates the Credit Repair Organizations Act.” Id. 
 80. See generally Hanft, supra note 7. 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a). 
 82. Id. § 1679g(a)(1)-(3); see also id. § 1679b (prohibited practices under the CROA). 
 83. Id. § 1679g(a)(1)(A), (B). A party who successfully enforces liability against a violator is enti-
tled to his costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. § 1679g(a)(3). 
 84. Id. § 1679g(a)(2). 
 85. Id. § 1679g(a)(2)(A), (B). The statute enumerates four factors “the court shall consider.” Id. § 
1679g(b). 
 86. Id. § 1679g(a)(3). 
 87. Hanft, supra note 7, at 2791; see CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012), 
rev’g 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010) (enforcing an arbitration agreement between parties who contract-
ed under the CROA). 
 88. Hanft, supra note 7, at 2792-2803. 
 89. See CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 673; Gay v. Creditinform, 511 F.3d 369, 382 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that arbitrating claims under the CROA is not in conflict with enforcing the Act); Picard v. 
Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the CROA’s language does 
not prohibit arbitration); Rex v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 788, 798 (W.D. 
Mich. 2007) (holding that the CROA disclosure statement merely entitled consumers to receive the 
statement and did not create any other rights). 
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create a non-waivable “right to sue” in court.90 Courts also focused on the federal 
courts’ long line of decisions enforcing arbitration agreements when claims were 
brought pursuant to other federal acts.91  
In affirming the denial of a motion to compel arbitration of a CROA claim, 
the Ninth Circuit became the first and only federal circuit to recognize that the 
CROA provides consumers with a non-waivable right to sue in court.92 The court 
found evidence of Congress’ intent to establish a consumer’s non-waivable right 
to bring an action in the text of the CROA, citing the repeated use of terms like 
“action” and “court” in the Act.93 The Ninth Circuit also used the “plain and ordi-
nary meaning” of the terms “arbitration” and “sue” to exclude the possibility of 
arbitration from a non-waivable “right to sue.”94 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
A. Majority Opinion 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to defendants to deter-
mine whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) prohibits arbitration 
agreements in a suit alleging violations under the Act.95 The primary disagreement 
the Court had with the decision of the Ninth Circuit involved judicial interpreta-
tion of the CROA’s “right to sue” language.96 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
CROA-required disclosure statement provided to consumers by credit organiza-
tions gave consumers a right to bring an action in a court of law.97 Another section 
of the CROA rendered void any waiver of a “protection . . . or any right of the 
consumer.”98 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that these provisions, when considered 
together, precluded enforceability of arbitration provisions in CROA contracts.99 
The Supreme Court reversed, providing its own reading of the Act’s language 
under which arbitration was not precluded and pointing out a lack of congression-
al intent to prohibit arbitration clauses in CROA contracts.100 
The Supreme Court interpreted the CROA’s disclosure requirement as only 
imposing an obligation on credit repair organizations (CROs) to provide consum-
ers with the specific statement written in the statute and not by its language creat-
ing a right of the consumer to bring an action in court.101 Section 1679c’s im-
 ___________________________  
 90. See, e.g., Gay, 511 F.3d at 382. 
 91. Hanft, supra note 7, at 2796. See, e.g., Gay, 511 F.3d at 383-85 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); see also supra Part III.A. 
 92. Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’g 617 F. Supp. 2d 
980 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); see also Hanft, supra note 7, at 2799 (“[T]he Ninth 
Circuit . . . thereby creat[ed] a definitive split among the circuits on the issue.”). 
 93. See Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1211. 
 94. Id. at 1208 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 112, 1473 (Bryan A. Gardner ed., 8th ed., 2004)). 
 95. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012), rev’g 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 
2010).  
 96. See generally id. at 669-73. 
 97. Id. at 669-70; see Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2006). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a)(1).  
 99. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 669. 
 100. See id. at 670-73. 
 101. Id. at 670. As the majority argument goes, “the only consumer right [that the CROA] creates is 
the right to receive the statement, which is meant to describe the consumer protections that the law 
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portance is that it alone provides consumers with certain information (their right to 
enforce liability) that they may only know from reading the disclosure state-
ment.102 According to the majority, a consumer’s power to bring a suit against a 
credit organization under the CROA comes from 15 U.S.C. § 1679g(a), which 
states that violators of the CROA “shall be liable” in actual and punitive damag-
es.103 The majority reasoned that if the “right to sue” language indeed created a 
right of the consumer, it would be “strikingly out of place in a section that is oth-
erwise devoted to giving the consumer notice of rights created elsewhere . . . .”104 
The Court also suggested that Congress, had it intended to block arbitration in 
CROA-regulated contracts, “would have done so in a manner less obtuse than 
what [plaintiffs] suggest.”105 
The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the CROA contains the req-
uisite congressional intent to “overrid[e] the FAA.”106 To overcome the federal 
courts’ presumption in favor of arbitration, plaintiffs had to prove that there was a 
“congressional command” to override the FAA.107 Plaintiffs argued that Congress’ 
repeated use of words like “action,” “class action,” and “court” was sufficient to 
establish intent to provide consumers with a “right” to bring an action in court.108 
The Court rejected this display of intent, stating that “[t]hese references cannot do 
the heavy lifting that [plaintiffs] assign them.”109 Three cited Supreme Court cases 
in particular supported the notion that arbitration was an acceptable forum for 
consumers to vindicate their right to enforce civil liabilities under a federal act.110 
The Court called the civil liability provision of the CROA a “mere ‘contempla-
tion’ of suit in any competent court,” and stated the language did not prevent a 
“reasonable forum-selection clause” as long as the consumer retained his “legal 
power to impose liability” under 1679g.111 
Faced with a case of first impression at this level, the Supreme Court held that 
the CROA’s language did not prohibit the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
 ___________________________  
elsewhere provides.” Id. Other statements that consumers have the “right to receive” (according to the 
majority) include a right to “dispute inaccurate information in your credit report[,] . . . a right to obtain 
a copy of your credit report[, and] . . . [a] right to cancel your contract . . . within 3 business days . . . .” 
15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a); CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 670. 
 102. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 670. This is a major point of contention between the majority opin-
ion and the dissenting opinion. See infra  Part IV.B. Later in the majority opinion, the Court opined 
that consumer interpretation of the “right to sue” language would be “a colloquial method of com-
municating to consumers that they have the legal right, enforceable in court, to recover damages from 
[CROs] that violate the CROA.” Id. at 672. Therefore, the language does not “require[] . . . the [CROs 
to] mislead consumers” as the plaintiffs suggest. Id. at 671. 
 103. See id. at n.2; 15 U.S.C. § 1679g(a)(1), (2). The majority believed that the only reason § 1679c 
should be mentioned at all in a suit is if the credit organization failed to make the required disclosures. 
CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at n.2. 
 104. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 670. 
 105. Id. at 672. In this section of the opinion, the majority provided examples of federal statutes in 
which Congress used express language to bar or at least restrict the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments. 
 106. Id. at 670 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). 
 107. Id. at 667 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (1987)). 
 108. Id. at 670. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 670-71. The three cases, Mitsubishi Motors Corp., McMahon, and Gilmer are described 
above. See supra Part III.A. 
 111. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 671. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679g (2006)). 
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between CROs and consumers.112 The disclosure provision, together with the non-
waiver provision, did nothing more than provide consumers with a right to infor-
mation—not a non-waivable right to bring an action in court.113 The Act’s text and 
legislative history did not point to a requisite “contrary congressional command” 
that arbitration prevents an adequate vindication of plaintiffs’ rights under the 
Act.114 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the denial 
of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration because it found nothing in the CROA 
that overrides the pro-arbitration policy of the federal courts.115  
B. Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion explaining why she would have 
affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and prohibited arbitration of plaintiffs’ 
claims.116 The dissent suggests that the majority erred by not considering the con-
text in which the disclosure statement would be read by consumers.117 Ginsburg 
believed that consumers, the “target audience in the CROA,” would read the 
“right to sue” language to mean “the right to litigate in court,” and opined that 
Congress expected this when they passed the CROA.118 According to the dissent, 
the text of the Act evidences Congress’ intention to prohibit “mandatory, creditor-
imposed, arbitration of CROA claims.”119 Ginsburg agreed with the Ninth Circuit 
that the CROA language itself provided consumers with a non-waivable right to 
sue.120 
The dissent also suggests that the majority misapplied precedent.121 Ginsburg 
explained that the CROA is distinguishable from federal acts like RICO and the 
ADEA in that it has a disclosure requirement that obligates CROs to inform con-
sumers of their “right to sue” an organization that violates the Act.122 Additional-
ly, acts like RICO and the ADEA do not contain a non-waiver provision analo-
gous to the CROA’s.123 The majority erred by not reading the statute “as a whole,” 
according to the dissent.124 Specifically, the majority failed to read the disclosure 
provision “in concert” with the civil liability provision.125 Ginsburg argued that 
 ___________________________  
 112. Id. at 673. 
 113. Id. at 670. 
 114. Id. at 670-71 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). 
 115. Id. at 673. 
 116. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg. J., dissenting). Evidencing her disdain for the majority’s conclusion, Gins-
burg referenced the majority’s decision as permitting CROs to “escape suit by providing in their take-
it-or-leave-it contracts that arbitration will serve as the parties’ sole dispute-resolution mechanism.” Id.  
 117. Id. at 678. 
 118. Id. at 676, 678. Ginsburg pointed out that in the “Findings” provision of the CROA, Congress 
described credit repair consumers as “inexperienced in credit matters” and having “limited economic 
means.” Id. at 678; 15 U.S.C. § 1679(a)(2). Ginsburg thought that the majority’s reading of the “right 
to sue” language was how a lawyer might think. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 676. 
 119. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 677. 
 120. Id. at 676. 
 121. Id. at 679. 
 122. Id.  “The CROA differs from [RICO and the ADEA because] . . . [t]he Act does not merely 
create a claim for relief. It designates the claim as an action entailing a “right to sue”. . . . Id.  (empha-
sis added). 
 123. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679f (2006)). 
 124. Id. at 678 (citing King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)). 
 125. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679c(a), 1679g). 
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the majority’s reading of the CROA “scarcely advances the Act’s goals” of pro-
tecting consumers from “unfair or deceptive advertising and business practic-
es.”126  
Finally, the dissent alleges a flaw in the majority’s argument that Congress 
would have been more express in prohibiting arbitration had that been its aim.127 
The majority, showing that Congress has in the past been explicit in prohibiting 
arbitration of claims under federal acts, cited acts that were passed six and four-
teen years after the CROA.128 Citing language from a Supreme Court case, Gins-
burg pointed out that the Court has previously issued a warning about inferring 
intent of a current Congress from the views of a prior one.129 
V. COMMENT 
In CompuCredit, the Supreme Court applied seemingly relevant precedent, 
but ultimately misinterpreted Congress’ intent in enacting the Credit Repair Or-
ganizations Act (CROA). The majority opinion’s fatal flaw, as pointed out by 
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, is that it overlooks the group of consumers which 
the CROA seeks to protect.130  The result is unjust for consumers, and further 
action by Congress is required if consumers are going to be fully protected against 
deceitful credit repair companies. Part A of this section examines the Supreme 
Court’s misinterpretation of Congressional intent in CompuCredit. Part B suggests 
a solution for consumers of credit repair services despite the Supreme Court’s 
decision in CompuCredit.  
A. The Supreme Court Misinterpreted Congress’ Intent in CompuCredit 
In CompuCredit, the Supreme Court provided its interpretation of Congress’ 
intent in drafting the CROA.131 The Court read the statute as if it was written for 
its members—legal scholars. The problem with this reading is that the specific 
portion of the statute in dispute, a mandatory disclosure statement, was written 
specifically for consumers to read prior to contracting with credit repair organiza-
tions (CROs).132 Congress’ request for such a level of transparency underlines 
their commitment in the CROA to curbing underhanded behaviors of such organi-
zations. The Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of the crucial words “right to sue” 
has resulted in an illogical and detrimental result for consumers. 
 ___________________________  
 126. Id. at 678-79 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1679(b)). 
 127. Id. at 679.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (citing U.S. v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). 
 130. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissent). 
 131. Id. at 670-72 (“[The disclosure statement] imposes an obligation on credit repair organizations to 
supply consumers with a specific statement set forth . . . in the statute. The only consumer right it 
creates is the right to receive the statement, which is meant to describe the consumer protections that 
the law elsewhere provides.”) (emphasis original). 
 132. 15 U.S.C. 1679c(a) (2006) (“Any credit repair organization shall provide any consumer with the 
following written statement before any contract or agreement between the consumer and the credit 
repair organization is executed . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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CROs emerged in the 1980s as consumers increased the amount of credit 
used to purchase goods and services.133 As credit usage increased, consumers dealt 
more often with credit reporting agencies, and their frustration ensued as consum-
ers were dissatisfied with their credit ratings.134 CROs promise consumers assis-
tance in improving their credit rating in exchange for payment.135 CROs attempt to 
accomplish this by sending letters to credit reporting agencies, challenging the 
accuracy of information contained in the consumer’s credit report.136 Under the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, if credit reporting agencies do not verify the accuracy 
of the information within a 30-day timeframe, it must be deleted until it its accu-
racy can be verified, thereby causing a positive impact on the consumer’s credit 
score.137 However, due to the low success rate of this strategy, CROs charge vari-
ous fees to consumers to profit on their service regardless of its effectiveness.138 
Preying on consumers who already have credit problems, some particularly decep-
tive CROs misrepresent what services they provide and convince consumers to 
pay for services that they do not perform.139  
Congress enacted the CROA to remedy this problem of CROs taking ad-
vantage of consumers in difficult financial situations.140 The statutory purposes of 
the CROA are twofold.141 First, the Act seeks to ensure that consumers receive 
necessary information about CROs in order “to make an informed decision” with 
respect to credit repair services.142 Second, the Act seeks to protect credit repair 
consumers from “unfair or deceptive” practices of CROs.143 Congress’ methods 
for accomplishing its purposes are requiring a mandatory disclosure statement 
from CROs to consumers detailing consumers’ rights and making civil remedies 
available for consumers when CROs violate the Act.144 Hence, the disclosure 
statement is a vital tool for Congress in accomplishing its purposes. 
In CompuCredit, the Supreme Court determined the legal ramifications of a 
particular provision of the disclosure statement, the consumer’s “right to sue.”145 
The majority held that the legal force of the disclosure statement is that it creates a 
consumer’s right to receive the information contained in it.146 The Court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ argument that the “right to sue” as printed in the disclosure statement 
created a separate “right” of the consumer to bring an action in court.147 Thus, 
 ___________________________  
 133. Nehf, supra note 6, at 798. 
 134. Id. A credit score is a three-digit number that predicts the risk that a debtor will become delin-
quent on his financial obligations in the next two years. McFadden, supra note 3. 
 135. 15 U.S.C. § 1679a(3)(A). 
 136. Nehf, supra note 6, at 800. For a detailed explanation of how credit organizations exploit the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, see id. at 786-803. 
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A); Hanft, supra note 7, at 2768-69; Nehf, supra note 6, at 800-01. 
 138. Hanft, supra note 7, at 2769. 
 139. Carol Odell, Credit Repair Trickery…Says Carol, Consumer News and Opinion Blog, Better 
Business Bureau, BETTERBUSINESSBUREAU.ORG (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.bbb.org/blog/2012/03/credit-repair-trickery-says-carol/. 
 140. Hanft, supra note 7, at 2769; see also id. 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 1679(b). 
 142. Id. § 1679(b)(1). 
 143. Id. § 1679(b)(2). 
 144. Id. §§ 1679c, 1679g. 
 145. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012), rev’g 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 146. Id. at 669-70. 
 147. Id. 
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because there is no “right to sue,” the language in the disclosure statement is not a 
non-waivable provision of the act under § 1679f, and parties are free to contract 
for arbitration.148 The Court cited several cases to support its conclusion that arbi-
tration was an adequate way for consumers to enforce statutorily-prescribed civil 
liability.149 
The main problem with the Court’s analysis is that its interpretation of the 
language is contrary to the purpose of the Act itself. As Justice Ginsburg points 
out in her dissent, the majority failed to consider the probable impact of the lan-
guage of the disclosure statement on the intended reader.150 The manner in which 
a consumer interprets the disclosure language is crucial to the function of the 
CROA. If the purpose of the Act—and more specifically the disclosure state-
ment—is to inform consumers so they are better prepared to deal with CROs, then 
the language should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with how a consum-
er would interpret the language.151 A consumer is not better prepared to deal with 
CROs if the rights that are explained to them do not actually exist. When a con-
sumer is told he has a “right” under a federal act, and statutory language in the 
same act dictates that no protections of the act may be waived, then permitting a 
service-provider to draft and enforce a contract abridging one of those protections 
is an abhorrent result. It is incomprehensible that Congress intended to equip con-
sumers with a weapon while allowing CROs to subtly reserve the right to throw 
up the near-impenetrable shield of the federal courts’ pro-arbitration policy.152 
Moreover, the CROA was drafted to protect consumers from deceptive CROs 
by heavily regulating what services CROs can perform and what promises they 
may make to consumers. It seems very relevant that the CROA requires CROs to 
provide the disclosure statement as a separate document prior to executing a con-
 ___________________________  
 148. Id. at 673; 15 U.S.C. § 1679f. 
 149. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 670-71 (“Thus, we have repeatedly recognized that contractually 
required arbitration of claims satisfies the statutory prescription of civil liability in court.”). 
 150. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg suggested that the majority’s reading of the 
language was “comprehensible to one trained to ‘think like a lawyer.’” Id. Clearly the average con-
sumer-reader of the disclosure statement is not going to be so trained. 
 151. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Recall that Congress’ target audience . . . is not composed of 
lawyers and judges [who are] accustomed to nuanced reading of statutory texts, but laypersons who 
receive a disclosure statement in the mail.”). Inexplicably, the majority, despite ultimately deciding 
that the placement of the words “right to sue” did not create an actual right under the statute, suggested 
a consumer interpretation not unlike Justice Ginsburg’s:  
 
[The “right to sue” language] is a colloquial method of communicating to consumers that they 
have the legal right, enforceable in court, to recover damages from [CROs] that violate the 
CROA. We think most consumers would understand it this way, without regard to whether the 
suit in court has to be preceded by an arbitration proceeding. 
 
Id. at 672. 
 152. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660-74 (1996). Lauren Saunders, manag-
ing attorney for the National Consumer Law Center, has urged that in light of Greenwood, the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau needs to “stop companies from using forced arbitration clauses to 
hide from the law.” U.S. Supreme Court High Fee Credit Card Decision Lets Predatory Lenders 
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tract with the consumer.153 This mandate of blatant transparency illustrates Con-
gress’ fear of CROs’ motive to deceive vulnerable consumers. Even more, part of 
the goal of the legislation was to discourage the practice altogether. It seems illog-
ical that Congress, disfavoring CROs in general,154 would require CROs to tell 
consumers that they had the “right to sue” while simultaneously allowing CROs to 
bury arbitration provisions in the physically-separate contract.155 The CROA ex-
ists to help consumers gain a foothold in understanding and negotiating the terms 
of credit repair services, not CROs.  
B. In the Aftermath of CompuCredit, Consumers Need Further Protection 
Notwithstanding the Court’s misinterpretation of Congressional intent in 
CompuCredit, there is another reason that the outcome of this case is unsatisfacto-
ry. When the Court determined that the CROA was “silent” with respect to arbi-
trability, it enforced the arbitration agreement, referencing the familiar “liberal 
federal policy” in favor of arbitration.156 However, the “liberal federal policy” in 
favor of arbitration should not be applied with equal liberality in every type of 
contract. Credit repair contracts, like those in CompuCredit, are good examples of 
contracts to which the policy should be applied more conservatively, because 
there are good reasons to keep disputes between CROs and consumers out of arbi-
tration. Even if arbitration agreements are permitted, they need to be more visible 
and comprehendible for consumers. 
In credit repair contracts, some of the justifications for the federal pro-
arbitration policy are mitigated or altogether absent.157 One such policy justifica-
tion is that the validity of arbitration agreements receives support from the free-
dom of parties to contract as they desire.158 This justification is rational when two 
parties have similar bargaining power and sophistication.159 Freedom to contract 
how such parties see fit enables them to reduce uncertainty by agreeing on what to 
do with respect to specific contingencies, and to act free from government re-
straints, which leads to increased efficiency.160 These benefits can be realized 
when the parties both understand and contribute to the drafting of terms, because 
the natural bargaining process is maintained. Credit repair contracts, however, are 
 ___________________________  
 153. 15 U.S.C. § 1679c (“Any [CRO] shall provide any consumer with the following written state-
ment before any contract . . . is executed . . . .”). 
 154. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 155. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 678-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s interpretation . . . 
enables the very deception Congress sought to suppress. Today’s decision permits credit repair organi-
zations to deny customers, through fine print in a contract, an important right whose disclosure is 
decreed in U.S. Code.”). 
 156. Id. at 673, 669. 
 157. See Sternlight, supra note 152, at 634-44 (proposing a federal arbitration policy under which 
“the [Supreme] Court should . . . apply the FAA . . . to accept binding arbitration where it is fair and 
has been accepted by the parties, and to reject binding arbitration where it has been foisted unfairly 
upon a weaker party”). 
 158. Id. at 675-76. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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adhesive in nature,161 and consumers are not truly contracting with full knowledge 
of the terms of the contract.162  
The “freedom” consumers have in a contract with CROs is a sham at best. 
Contrary to the required plain language of the disclosure statement, there is no 
federal mandate for CRO arbitration clauses to be as clear. There is little guaran-
tee that consumers will not only read but also understand the “legal sophistica-
tion” of an arbitration clause.163 In credit repair contracts, consumers may not 
fully appreciate that arbitration, despite sometimes offering a faster, cheaper 
method of dispute resolution,164 can lead to less discovery and proceedings largely 
dictated by the more sophisticated party.165 Consumers will not have an opportuni-
ty to weigh these pros and cons without better notice of arbitration clauses in cred-
it repair contracts. If the Supreme Court wants to enforce arbitration contracts, 
then Congress needs to step in and mandate a similar disclosure statement-type 
transparency for arbitration clauses, too.  
This problem of unfairness to consumers has not been completely ignored by 
the U.S. government. Congress already expressed its concern for credit consumers 
in the language of the CROA itself, finding that CROs were causing a “financial 
hardship” on consumers “of limited economic means . . . who are inexperienced in 
credit matters.”166 Additionally, consumer groups have spoken out against Com-
puCredit’s result.167 These groups are pushing for the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau to fast-track its study on restricting mandatory pre-dispute arbitra-
tion.168 Once the study is completed, the Bureau can impose regulations prohibit-
ing or limiting arbitration agreements, as long as the regulations are consistent 
with the study.169 In Congress, similar bills sit in each house that could make 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable in consumer contracts, 
among others.170 
The Supreme Court’s decision in CompuCredit reads primarily as another eu-
logy for choice-of-forum in a supposedly consumer-protecting federal act. It ap-
pears the Court shirked common sense and applied a federal policy that is too 
broad in some cases. The Court refused to interpret the language of the disclosure 
statement like an intended reader of the statement, thus frustrating Congress’ in-
tent to inform consumers. Congress must respond by providing additional protec-
 ___________________________  
 161. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing credit repair organizations’ 
contracts as “take-it-or-leave-it”). 
 162. See Sternlight, supra note 153, at 675-77 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s preference for 
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tion under the CROA. If consumers’ express “right to sue” is not going to be hon-
ored, then they deserve the right to a clear explanation of the forum to which they 
are headed when the predatory CROs go back on their word. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has once again stood by its policy of favoring arbitration, 
this time at the expense of the consumer. The result in CompuCredit is a small 
travesty in that the nation’s highest court has let consumers down. The majority 
ignored, or at the very least misunderstood, Congress’ desire to protect vulnerable 
consumers in credit repair contracts. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent pokes several 
holes in the majority’s argument, including their refusal to read the disclosure 
statement the way it was intended to be read. In light of this decision, consumers 
need additional protection from arbitration clauses buried deep into contract terms 
by often deceptive credit repair organizations. Congress can remedy this problem 
in a way that reinforces the purposes of the CROA. If Congress requires CROA-
level transparency of arbitration clauses in credit repair contracts, it can still ac-
complish its goal of ensuring that consumers make informed decisions about cred-
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